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COMPARATIVE FAULT IN MARYLAND: THE
TIME HAS COME
EDWARD S. DIGGES, JR.*
AND ROBERT DALE KLEIN **
One would think it axiomatic that Maryland's legal system should
not force one to pay for damage that one did not cause, yet for over a
century the law of this state has done just that. The exactor of this
inequitable penalty goes by the name of "contributory negligence."
This article will examine an alternative that Maryland might choose-
comparative fault.
I. THE COMPARATIVE FAULT CONCEPT VS. THE CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE DOCTRINE
Comparative fault rests on the principle that every person should
be liable to another to the extent that he is at fault in causing injury or
damage to the other.' It imposes liability for damages in proportion to
the relative fault of each party causing the injury or loss. Comparative
fault is the law in thirty-eight American states, Puerto Rico, the Canal
Zone, the Virgin Islands, Guam and most other common law and civil
law nations.2 What once was described as the "march" of comparative
fault,3 is now a "stampede". 4
Unlike comparative fault, the contributory negligence doctrine is
an all-or-nothing proposition. It completely bars recovery of damages
* B.A. 1968, Princeton University, J.D. 1971, University of Maryland School of Law.
Mr. Digges is a partner in the Baltimore law firm of Piper & Marbury. A substantial
amount of Mr. Digges' practice is devoted to the defense of manufacturing concerns in prod-
uct liability actions.
** B.S. 1973, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, J.D. 1976, Columbia University.
Mr. Klein is an associate with the Baltimore law firm of Piper & Marbury.
1. C. HEFT & C. HEFT, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL § 1.10, at 1 (rev. ed.
1978).
2. A useful compendium of the laws of the states adopting comparative fault principles
may be found in Victor E. Schwartz's thorough treatise, V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEG-
LIGENCE, 367 app. A, 369 app. B (1974 & Supp. 198 1). For the law elsewhere in the world,
see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 67, at 436 nn. 80 & 81 (4th ed. 1971);
V. SCHWARTZ, SUpra, at 31-42; Mole & Wilson,., Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 COR-
NELL L.Q. 333, 337 (1932); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 189, 238-45 (1950).
3. Turk, supra note 2; Woods, The Quickening March of Comparative Fault, CASE &
COM., July - Aug. 1980, at 35.
4. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 2 (Supp. 1981).
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by a person whose fault contributes to that damage, no matter how
slight that fault might be.5 Maryland is one of the last bastions of con-
tributory negligence, joined only by eleven other states and the District
of Columbia. Six of these other jurisdictions have or have had statutes
applying comparative fault in limited areas, such as accidents involving
intrastate railroad employees,7 certain hazardous employments,8 rail-
road crossings9 or automobiles.'° Thus Maryland is one of only seven
jurisdictions that have yet to join the comparative fault parade.
II. THE ORIGINS OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Although many believe that contributory negligence has been with
us since "time immemorial","I it is actually a doctrine of fairly recent
origin.' 2 Its roots may be traced to the 1809 English case of Butterfield
v. Forrester, in which the plaintiff horseman rode his steed at dusk as
fast as it would go through the streets of Derby. The equestrian was
injured when his horse tripped over an obstruction left in the road by
the defendant. The jury returned a defendant's verdict after being in-
structed to do so if satisfied that a reasonable person riding with ordi-
nary care could have seen and avoided the obstruction. In the terseper
curiam affirmance,"" Lord Ellenborough said "two things must concur
to support this action, an obstruction in the road by the fault of the
5. See, e.g., Jennings v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 516, 526 (D. Md. 1959), vacated on
other grounds, 291 F.2d 880 (4th Cir. 1961); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. State ex rel. Miller, 29
Md. 252, 262 (1868).
6.' In addition to Maryland, the twelve jurisdictions retaining the contributory negli-
gence doctrine are Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Missouri, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of Columbia. See V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 185 app. A, 189 app. B (Supp. 1981).
7. IowA CODE ANN. § 479.124 (West 1946); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.320 (Baldwin
1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62.242 (1975).
8. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-806 (1956).
9. VA. CODE § 56-416 (1981).
10. Section 15-1-300 of the 1976 South Carolina Code was a comparative fault statute for
autombile accidents, but it was declared void on equal protection grounds because of its
limited coverage. Marley v. Kirby, 271 S.C. 122, 245 S.E.2d 604 (1978).
11. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. 147, 149, (1854), where the Pennsylvania
court labelled contributory negligence as a "rule from time immemorial,. . .not likely to be
changed in all time to come." By consensus, the first American case to apply the doctrine
was Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824). See generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES,
LAW OF TORTS § 22.1, at 1194 n.6 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 65, at 416 n.l; Turk,
supra note 2, at 198.
12. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 11, § 22.1, at 1194; Wade, Comparative Negli-
gence - Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L.
REV. 299, 299 (1980).
13. 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
14. Few, if any, decisions of such brevity have had as tremendous and enduring an
impact on our judicial system. One writer notes that the opinion "could be wired at night
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defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the
plaintiff."' 5
In a recent article, Professor Wade suggests that two pervasive
common law attitudes account for the adoption of the contributory
negligence rule: first, a puritanical view that the courts should not assist
a wrongdoer to recoup damages sustained as a result of his wrongdo-
ing; and second, a passion for simple issues that could be answered
categorically yes or no.' 6 The common law courts did not view them-
selves as agencies of compromise and thus did not consider granting a
plaintiff damages reduced in proportion to the measure of his fault. 17
Other legal historians suggest that the doctrine was attractive in the
nineteenth century because it served as a judicial curb on overly sym-
pathetic juries during the industrial revolution.' 8
The contributory negligence rule appears to have first surfaced in
Maryland in an 1847 case, Irwin v. Sprigg. 19 In an apparent reaction to
the harshness of this rule, the Court of Appeals adopted the doctrine of
last clear chance twelve years later in Northern Central Railway v.
State. 2 0 The doctrine of last clear chance permits the contributorily
negligent plaintiff to recover his damages if the defendant had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident.2 ' When the doctrine applies, it nul-
lifies the effect of the plaintiffs contributory negligence. 22
III. COMPARATIVE FAULT SYSTEMS
Comparative fault,23 insofar as it reflects the principle that parties
letter rate without extra charge." Malone, The Formative Era ofContributory Negligence, 41
ILL. L. REV. 151, 151 (1946).
15. 103 Eng. Rep. at 927.
16. Wade, supra note 12, at 299-300.
17. Id
18. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 11, at 1197-99. Malone, supra note 14, at 155-69;
Malone, Comparative Negligence - Louisiana's Forgotten Heritage, 6 LA. L. REV. 125, 139-40
(1945); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. REV. 465, 468-69 (1953); Turk, supra
note 2, at 201.
19. 6 Gill 200, 205 (Md. 1847).
20. 29 Md. 420, 436-37 (1868).
21. For a discussion of the last clear chance doctrine, see W. PROSSER, supra note 2,
§ 66, at 438.
22. Id.
23. The terms "comparative fault" and "comparative negligence" frequently are used
interchangeably by the Bar in referring to the concept of apportioning damages based on a
party's role in causing injury or damage. The term "comparative fault," however, is the
more accurate of the two, in that it is not limited to negligent activity but also encompasses
other forms of legal responsibility or fault such as strict liability in tort, unreasonable as-
sumption of the risk, product misuse, unreasonable failure to avoid injury or mitigate dam-
ages, and breach of warranty resulting in personal injury or property damage. See infra
notes 54-61 and accompanying text (discussing the UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT).
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at fault should share the costs of accidents to which they contribute, is
not a new legal concept.24 For centuries before the 1809 Butterfield
decision, British courts of admiralty had been apportioning damages
among parties at fault on an equal share basis.25 American admiralty
courts also followed this practice until recently.26 In 1975, the United
States Supreme Court adopted true comparative negligence in admi-
ralty cases and began to allocate damages in proportion to the relative
percentages of the parties' fault.27
The modem comparative fault doctrine has taken a variety of
forms, some fashioned by the courtS,28 others drawn by legislatures.
29
Comparative fault systems may be divided into two types, "pure" and
"modified."
A. "'Pure" Comparative Fault
Under this form, it makes no difference whose fault was greater.
24. For an excellent history of the comparative fault concept, see Turk, supra note 2, at
208-45. See also V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 31-42; Mole & Wilson, supra note 2, at 337-
66.
25. See Mole & Wilson, supra note 2, at 339-46; Turk, supra note 2, at 226-31.
26. Ralston v. The State Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201, 208 (E.D. Pa. 1836) (No. 11, 540), ap-
pears to be the first American decision applying the equal division rule. In 1854, the United
States Supreme Court had its first opportunity to consider the concept, which it adopted in
The Schooner Catherine, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 170 (1854). See generally Mole & Wilson, supra
note 2, at 346-59, Turk, supra note 2, at 231-38.
27. United States v. Reliable Transfer, 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
28.-Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New Mexico, and West Virginia are
the seven states which have judicially adopted the comparative fault concept. Kaatz v.
State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Alvis v. Rybar, 85 I11. 2d
1,421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511
(1979); Scott v. Rizzo, 20 N. M. St. B. Bull. 289 (1981); Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.,
256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
29. See ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 1765 (1979); C.Z. CODE tit. 4, § 1357 (1963);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572h (West Supp.
1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-603 (1968); GUAM CIV. CODE § 1714 (1979); HAWAII REV.
STAT. § 663-31 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 6-801 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1976); LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 156 (1980);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (West Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West
Supp. 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 58-607.1
(Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141 (1979); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:71 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West Supp. 1981);
N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1975); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.19 (Page 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 13 (West Supp. 1980);
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1980); P.R.
LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141 (1968); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-20-4 (Supp. 1980); S.D. Comp. LAWS
ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § I (Vernon Supp. 1980);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-37 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1036 (1973); V.I. CODE ANN.
tit. 5, § 1451 (1979); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.22.010 (Supp. 1980); WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.045 (West Supp. 1981); WYo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (1977).
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Pure comparative fault permits a plaintiff to recover the portion of his
damages caused by the defendant's fault, even though the plaintiff's
fault might exceed that of the defendant.
Pure comparative fault enjoys popularity in the United States and
abroad. It is the law in eleven states, Puerto Rico, and the Canal
Zone.30 The Uniform Comparative Fault Act adopts the pure form.3 1
The United States Supreme Court also adopted this form for the appor-
tionment of property damages in admiralty litigation,32 and several
federal statutes employ this approach.33 Finally, pure comparative
fault is the rule in England, in most political units of Canada and Aus-
tralia, and in most other common law and civil law nations.34
B. "'Modified" Comparative Fault
Twenty-seven states and the Virgin Islands have taken so-called
"modified" approaches to comparative fault.35 These approaches per-
30. Eleven states adopted the pure form in the indicated years:
1910- Mississippi
1971 - Rhode Island
1973 - Florida and Washington (Washington's was enacted in 1973, effective
1/1/74)
1975 - Alaska, California and New York
1979 - Louisiana and Michigan
1980 - New Mexico
1981 - Illinois
The pure form also has been adopted in the Canal Zone (1963) and Puerto Rico (1975).
31. For a discussion of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, see infra text accompanying
notes 54-61.
32. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
33. The "pure" comparative negligence approach is incorporated in the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976), the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1976), and the
Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1976).
34. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 49 & n.3 1.
35. The modified form was adopted in twenty-seven states, the Virgin Islands and
Guam according to the following chronology:
1860- Georgia
1913 - Nebraska
1931 - Wisconsin
1941 - South Dakota
1955 - Arkansas
1965 - Maine
1969 - Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and New Hampshire
1970- Vermont
1971 - Colorado, Idaho, and Oregon
1973 - Connecticut, Guam, Nevada, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas,
Utah, the Virgin Islands, and Wyoming
1974- Kansas
1975 - Montana
1976 - Pennsylvania
1979 - West Virginia
1980- Ohio
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mit the plaintiff to recover if his fault is relatively small in contrast with
the defendant's. If the plaintiff's fault is not sufficiently small, however,
his contributory negligence remains a bar to recovery. Modified com-
parative fault systems may be divided into three types:
1. "Slight/Gross"-The plaintiff may recover that portion of his
damages caused by the defendant's gross fault, unless the plaintiff's
fault is not slight in contrast to the defendant's, in which case the plain-
tiff recovers nothing. The defendant recovers nothing under this ap-
proach, which is followed only in the states of Nebraska3 6 and South
Dakota.
37
2. "Not As Great As"-Ten states38 have adopted this modified
form, which permits a plaintiff to recover only if his fault is less than
that of the defendant.39 If it is, the plaintiff may recover damages re-
duced by the percentage of his own fault, and the defendant recovers
nothing.
3. "Not Greater Than"-This is the most popular of the modified
approaches, having been adopted in fifteen states." If the plaintiff's
fault is less than or equal to the defendant's fault, the plaintiff may
recover damages reduced by the percentage of his own fault, and the
defendant ordinarily recovers nothing.4'
Anomalous situations may arise in jurisdictions that have adopted
modified comparative fault and yet retain the doctrine of last clear
chance.42 In such jurisdictions, a plaintiff may actually be better off if
his negligence is so great that it bars his recovery under comparative
negligence principles. For instance, in a "not as great as" jurisdiction,
36. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151 (1979).
37. S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 20-9-2 (1979).
38. The "49%" or "not as great as" form is employed in Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia,
Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Guam also re-
quires that the plaintiffs fault be less than that of the defendant in order to recover. GUAM
CIv. CODE § 1714 (1979).
39. When there are two parties to a suit and one is not clearly more negligent than the
other, a jury will tend to find that each is 50% at fault. The "not as great as" rule therefore
favors defendants, for under that rule, the plaintiff cannot recover unless the defendant is at
least 51% at fault. On the other hand, the "not greater than" rule favors plaintiffs, for a
plaintiff who is found 50% at fault will still recover.
40. The "50%" or "not greater than" form has been adopted by Connecticut, Hawaii,
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Wisconsin, and the Virgin Islands.
41. If the jury determines that the defendant and the plaintiff were each 50% at fault,
each can recover 50% of his damages. In this situation, the "not greater than" rule operates
exactly as pure comparative negligence would.
42. States with general comparative negligence laws that have retained last clear chance
include Georgia, Nebraska, South Dakota, West Virginia and probably New Hampshire.
See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, § 7.2, at 58 (Cum. Supp. 1981).
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a contributorily negligent plaintiff will recover a percentage of his dam-
ages if he is less than 50% at fault. If he is 50% or more at fault, he
ordinarily will recover nothing. However, if the doctrine of last clear
chance applies, he can recover 100% of his damages. The doctrine of
last clear chance will nullify the effect of his contributory negligence.
Thus if the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident, a
plaintiff 49% at fault will recover only 51% of his damages, although a
plaintiff 50% at fault could recover 100% of his damages.
IV. WHICH FORM SHOULD MARYLAND ADOPT?
The growing trend toward comparative fault suggests that it is
only a matter of time before Maryland joins the parade. The pertinent
question is no longer whether Maryland should adopt comparative
fault, but rather what form of the doctrine Maryland should choose.
Scholars agree that pure comparative fault is the superior ver-
sion.43 All but one of the jurisdictions that have judicially adopted
comparative fault have chosen the pure approach.44 Finally, pure com-
parative fault is the rule in most parts of the Western World.
The modified approaches all suffer the same defects. When a
plaintiff is not entitled to recover under a modified comparative system,
both parties bear their own losses. In this situation, the modified sys-
tems are no better than the contributory negligence system. However,
when the plaintiff does recover, these systems impose on one party the
burden of bearing all of his damagesplus a portion of the damages of
the person who was at fault to a lesser degree.45 In this sense, they are
worse than the contributory negligence system, in which each of two
negligent parties bears only his own losses. Furthermore, the modified
43. See, e.g., V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 342-48; Juenger, Brieffor Negligence Law
Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae,
Parsonson v. Construction Equipment Company, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 3, 49-50 (1972); P.
Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 1, 9 (1974); R. Keeton, Comments
on Maki v. Frelk - Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature
Decide?, 21 VAND. L. REV. 906, 911 (1968); Prosser, supra note 18, at 508; Wade, A Un!form
Comparative Fault Act - What Should it Provide?, 10 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 220, 225 (1977).
44. West Virginia follows a modified approach. Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256
S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979). As might be expected, West Virginia's decision to adopt a modi-
fied version ("not as great as") has been both criticized, see Cady, Alas and,41ack, Modified
Comparative Negligence Comes to West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 473 (1980); Buffa, The
Plainti's View of Comparative Negligence, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 523 (1980), and praised, see
Emch, Comparative Negligence in West Virginia: A De/ense Overview, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 493
(1980)).
45. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Prefatory Note to UNI-
FORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, (1977) [hereinafter cited as Prefatory Note]; Wade, Uni-
form Comparative Fault Act, 14 F. 385 (1979).
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systems may yield particularly inequitable results in jurisdictions that
retain the doctrine of last clear chance.46 Also, cases involving multiple
defendants create complex problems in modified comparative fault
jurisdictions. 47
In contrast, critics appear to have expressed only two reservations
about pure comparative fault, and neither is substantial. First, some
urge that the pure type fails to discourage "nuisance suits."48 The Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NC-
CUSL) dismisses this argument as a chimera, stating that it is much
more likely that a plaintiff's fault would be less than 90%, that directed
verdict concepts usually control nuisance litigation, and that, in any
event, the asserted cure of the modified approaches is worse than the
disease.49
The second objection to pure comparative fault focuses on hypo-
thetical cases in which the less responsible party ends up paying more
than the damages he has sustained. 0 For example, assume the follow-
ing scenario:
Pure Pure
Comparative Comparative
Share of Share of
Party's Party's Plaintiffs Defendant's
Fault Damages Damages Damages
Plaintiff 75% $10,000 $ 7,500 $ 750
Defendant 25% 1,000 2,500 250
Total 100% $11,000 $10,000 $1,000
Under the pure approach, the defendant bears not only $250 of his own
damages, but also $2,500 of the plaintiffs damages. In contrast, under
a modified system, the defendant would be responsible only for $250 of
his own damages, and under a contributory negligence system, only for
his own $1,000 damages. The plaintiff under these three approaches,
would bear $8,250, $10,750 or $10,000, respectively.
46. See Prefatory Note, supra note 45; Wade, supra note 45, at 385.
47. The modified forms are criticized for the confusion that can be generated in multiple
defendant cases where the plaintiff's fault is less than that of some defendants but more than
that of others. Resolution of contribution claims and counterclaims is unclear under the
modified approaches, unless they provide that a plaintiff may recover so long as his negli-
gence does not exceed the combined negligence of all defendants. This provision, however,
essentially adopts the pure form of comparative negligence. See Prefatory Note, supra note
45; Cady, supra note 44, at 480-86.
48. See Prefatory Note, supra note 45.
49. See Prefatory Note, supra note 45; see also Wade, supra note 45, at 385-86.
50. See, e.g., Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 885 (W. Va. 1979).
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These hypotheticals demonstrate that contributory negligence and
modified comparative fault systems favor the more innocent party. But
they do not demonstrate that these systems achieve more equitable re-
suits. The pure comparative fault system is inherently fairer, for under
that system each party pays his share of the total cost of the tortious
occurrence.5 One commentator suggests that such hypotheticals are
classic examples of hard cases making bad law. 2 The Supreme Court
of Illinois recently observed, "The 'pure' form of comparative negli-
gence is the only system which truly apportions damages according to
the relative fault of the parties and thus achieves total justice. [Any of
the modified forms] 'simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory
negligence rule to a different ground.'-5
V. THE UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
Drafted and approved in 1977 by the NCCUSL, the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act adopts the pure comparative fault approach. 4
Applicability of the Act is not restricted to negligence actions and thus
the Act speaks not in terms of negligence, but in terms of "fault". 55
The Act governs all cases involving negligent or reckless conduct, strict
liability in tort, unreasonable assumption of risk, product misuse, un-
reasonable failure to avoid injury or to mitigate damages, and any
breach of warranty resulting in personal or property damage. It does
5 1. See V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 344-45; Cady, supra note 44, at 480-86. •
52. In Professor Schwartz's example, the plaintiff was 90% at fault:
On the surface, the result of the hypothetical cases seems hard to justify. Never-
theless, there is a convincing answer in justification. First, making a judgment about an
entire comparative negligence system based on an unusual hypothetical case is a classic
example of a hard case making bad law. Mississippi has had pure comparative negli-
gence since 1910 in all personal injury actions; yet a search of the pages of annotations
to that statute will not reveal any cases in which a 90% at fault plaintiff obtained a
substantial recovery from a defendant.
Even judging the hypothetical case as if it were likely to occur, the fault of the
plaintiff has not been ignored. He has been made to bear 90% of his costs and 90% of
the defendant's costs from an accident for which he was 90% at fault. Why should he
bear 100% of all costs? Or even all of his own costs plus 90% of defendant's? This
would tax him beyond his culpability.
Finally, any surface unfairness of pure comparative negligence is reduced by
the fact that proximate cause rules may bar the claims of plaintiffs when their negli-
gence was the substantial cause of the accident.
V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 345 (footnotes omitted).
53. Alvis v. Rybar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898 (1981) (quoting Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975)).
54. UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform
State Laws 1977) [hereinafter cited as ACT]. A copy of the AT is reprinted in the appendix
of this Article.
55. See id. § 1.
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not cover mere economic loss resulting from misrepresentation, injuri-
ous falsehood, defamation, breach of warranty, or interference with
contractual relations.56
Under the Act, the factfinder determines at trial the total amount
of damages that each claimant has suffered.57 Next, the factfinder de-
termines the relative percentages of each person's fault in causing the
injury-producing event. Then it is incumbent on the court to reduce
each claimant's total damages by the percentage of his fault in causing
the damage. 5
8
When more than one defendant is at fault, the defendants will be
jointly and severally liable.59 In other words, the claimant can recover
his entire judgment from any party against whom the judgment is en-
tered. The court determines contribution in accordance with the re-
spective percentages of fault of those liable on the judgment.60 For
example:
1. Motorist P sues motorist D-1, auto mechanic D-2, and seatbelt
manufacturer D-3 for P's damages of $10,000.
2. The jury allocates fault as follows:
P: 40%
D- 1: 40%
D-2: 15%
D-3: 5%
3. Judgment for P is entered against D-1, D-2, and D-3 for $6,000
(60% of $10,000).
4. The court states in the judgment the equitable share of the obli-
gation of each party:
P's equitable share is $4,000 (40% of $10,000).
D- l's equitable share is $4,000 (40%, of $10,000).
D-2's equitable share is $1,500 (15% of $10,000).
D-3's equitable share is $500 (5% of $10,000).
5. Assume that P, with a joint and several judgment for $6,000
against D-1, D-2, and D-3, collects the entire amount from D-3. Upon
proper motion to the court, D-3 is entitled to contribution from D- 1 in
the amount of $4,000 (8/12 of $6,000) and from D-2 in the amount of
$1,500 (3/12 of $6,000).
56. The ACT, of course, does encompass economic loss consequential to harm to person
or property, such as doctors' bills, loss of wages, or costs of repair or replacement of prop-
erty. See id. § 1 Comment.
57. Id. § 2.
58. See id. § 2(c).
59. Id.
60. Id. §§ 2(d), 5.
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The Act provides for reallocation of the uncollectible equitable
share of a judgment debtor. Upon motion made within a specified time
(e.g., one year) after judgment is entered, the uncollectible amount will
be reallocated among all parties, including the claimant.6' For exam-
ple, using the above illustration, assume that D-l's 40% share was un-
collectible. Upon proper motion by D-3, the court orders that D-l's
equitable share be reallocated among P, D-2 and D-3:
P's equitable share is increased by $2,666.67 (8/12 of $4,000) and P
must pay that amount to D-3.
D-2's equitable share is increased by $1,000.00 (3/12 of $4,000)
and must pay that amount to D-3 in addition to his original contribu-
tion of $1,500.
D-3's equitable share is increased by $333.33 (1/12 of $4,000)
which is additional loss that D-3 must bear.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act has not been adopted in any
jurisdiction. However, the Act is new, and it continues to receive legis-
lative and judicial study.
VI. THE STRICT TORT LIABILITY CASE
Comparative negligence principles can be implemented easily in
basic negligence or premises liability actions, and even in professional
malpractice actions. However, doctrinal problems arise in applying
comparative negligence to the strict liability action that is now the the-
ory of choice in products liability.62
First, to use the comparative negligence approach, one must char-
acterize the strict liability tort action as a form of negligence.63 Some
argue that this characterization impermissibly mingles "apples and or-
anges".' Others more persuasively argue, however, that doctrinaire
positions must yield if the tort system is to achieve balance - espe-
cially here, because use of comparative fault in a strict liability tort
action actually provides a more understandable and workable mecha-
61. Id. § 2(d).
62. Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 353, 363 A.2d 955, 963 (1976) (adopt-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) as the guiding principle for the strict
liability in tort cause of action).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment n (1965) notes that the liabil-
ity with which that section deals is not premised upon the negligence of the seller. See also
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1956).
64. It is argued that to compare no fault liability of the product supplier with the fault of
the product user is inappropriate. See Westra, Restructuring the Defenses to Strict Products
Liabilities - An Alternative to Comparative Negligence, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 355, 356 n.7
(1979).
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nism for the factfinder.65 In a few jurisdictions the courts have applied
comparative negligence statutes in strict product liability cases.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, a pioneer in the area of compara-
tive negligence principles, characterized strict tort liability as the
equivalent of negligence per se:
Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective product unreasona-
bly dangerous to an intended user or consumer now arises in this
state by virtue of a decision of this court. If this same liability
were imposed for violation of a statute, it is difficult to perceive
why we could not consider it negligence per se for the purpose of
applying the comparative negligence statute just as we have done
so many times in other cases involving the so-called "safety
statutes."
66
Using this perceptive reasoning, the Wisconsin Supreme Court circum-
vented the conceptual dilemma presented by an attempt to compare the
defendant's strict liability with the contributory negligence of the
user.67 Florida and Minnesota recently adopted this approach. 68
Other courts have offered other justifications for applying compar-
ative negligence statutes to strict liability tort actions. For example, in
Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp. ,69 the federal court
applied the Idaho comparative negligence statute, observing that "the
rationale of Idaho's comparative negligence statute extends to a com-
parison of all legal causes of the plaintiffs injuries and results in a sen-
sible and fair method of loss allocation."70 Similarly, in Stueve v.
American Honda Motors Co. ,7 the federal court concluded that it was
65. See W. PROSSER, supra, note 2, § 65, at 418; Schwartz, Strict Liability and Compara-
tive Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171, 181 (1974) (Application of comparative fault will
eliminate the esoteric and shadowy differentiations in existing defense concepts.).
66. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967) (Plaintiff, a
patron in a tavern, was injured as he assisted in relocating a 750-pound pool table. One leg
of the pool table collapsed, causing the table to fall and severely injure his foot.).
67. See Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some Product
Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 297 (1977), for a criticism of the Wisconsin characteri-
zation approach as nullifying the objectives of § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS.
68. West v. Caterpillar, 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Constr., Inc., 262
N.W. 2d 377 (Minn. 1977). Busch involved a plaintiff who was injured in a single-vehicle
overturn while attempting to negotiate a curve at a relatively high rate of speed. West con-
cerned a bystander who was struck and fatally injured by a Caterpillar grader that was being
backed-up without any audible warning signals.
69. 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976) (Several individuals were fatally injured in the
crash of an aircraft manufactured by the defendant.).
70. Id. at 603.
71. 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978) (Plaintiff was fatally burned when the motorcycle
that he was operating collided with an automobile causing the gas tank on the motorcycle to
rupture and erupt into flames.).
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appropriate to apply a comparative negligence statute in a strict liabil-
ity tort action because "no social policy. . . should compel defendants
to pay more than their fair share of the loss. ' '72
In some jurisdictions, the courts adopted comparative fault for
strict liability actions even though the jurisdictions had no comparative
fault statutes. For example, after reviewing the objectives of the strict
liability doctrine and the necessity for a balancing of equities between
all parties, the Alaska Supreme Court declared in Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. :7
We feel that pure comparative negligence can provide a predicate
of fairness to products liability cases in which the plaintiff and de-
fendant contribute to the injury. The defendant is strictly liable
due to the existence of a defective condition in the product. On
the other hand, the plaintiffs liability attaches as a result of his
conduct in using the product. It is appropriate, therefore, that the
parties' contribution to the injury be apportioned. The defendant
is strictly liable for the harm caused from his defective product,
except that the award of damages shall be reduced in proportion to
the plaintiffs contribution to his injury.74
Similarly, in Daly v. General Motors Corp.,7 the California
Supreme Court renounced previously recognized tort defenses to a
strict liability action in favor of a judicially created comparative fault
defense.76
[T]he terms "comparative negligence," "contributory negligence"
and "assumption of risk" do not, standing alone, lend themselves
to the exact measurement of a micrometer-caliper, or to such pre-
cise definition as to divert us from otherwise strong and consistent
countervailing policy considerations. Fixed semantic consistency
at this point is less important than the attainment of a just and
equitable result. The interweaving of concept and terminology in
this area suggests a judicial posture that is flexible rather than
72. Id. at 751 (quoting Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195, 203, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (1978)).
73. 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976) (plaintiff injured when a pulley guard shattered).
74. Id. at 45-46. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), the
Alaska Supreme Court clarified the type of conduct encompassed by comparative fault stat-
ing: "[Any negligence of the plaintiff which contributes to the chain of events leading to his
injury may be considered by the jury." Id. at 890.
75. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978) (Plaintiff was operating his
vehicle on a freeway at a high rate of speed when he collided with a guardrail dividing the
south and northbound lanes of travel, an impact which caused the driver's door to be thrown
open and the plaintiff to be ejected onto the pavement.).
76. In essence, the California Supreme Court extended its decision in Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975), to an action premised on strict
tort liability.
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doctrinaire."
[I]n this evolving area of tort law in which new remedies are judi-
cially created, and old defenses judicially merged, impelled by
strong considerations of equity and fairness we seek a larger syn-
thesis. If a more just result follows from the expansion of compar-
ative principles, we have no hesitancy in seeking it, mindful
always that the fundamental and underlying purpose of Li was to
promote the equitable allocation of loss among all parties legally
responsible in proportion to their fault.78
In Butaud and Daly the Supreme Courts of Alaska and California
extended comparative fault to strict liability actions. Under these deci-
sions, any unreasonable act or omission in using the product reduces
recovery to the extent that the user's unreasonable conduct contributed
to the injury-producing event.79
Strict liability in tort is a judicially sculptured doctrine. It is ap-
propriate, therefore, for courts to modify the doctrine. More important,
the social objective of the strict liability doctrine is to compensate users
injured by defective products unduly dangerous for their intended and
reasonably foreseeable uses, without making the product supplier a
guarantor against all harm resulting from use of a product. Compara-
tive fault is consonant with that objective. Although the supplier is still
strictly liable for the injury caused by the defect, the plaintiffs recovery
77. 20 Cal. 3d at 736, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The court noted the late
Dean Prosser's analysis of contributory negligence:
It is perhaps unfortunate that contributory negligence is called negligence at all. 'Con-
tributory fault' would be a more descriptive term. Negligence as it is commonly under-
stood is conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to others. Contributory
negligence is conduct which involves an undue risk of harm to the actor himself. Negli-
gence requires a duty, an obligation of conduct to another person. Contributory negli-
gence involves no duty, unless we are to be so ingenious as to say that the plaintiff is
under an obligation to protect the defendant against liability for the consequences of his
own negligence.
Id. at 735, 575 P.2d at 1168, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
78. Id. at 737, 575 P.2d at 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 387. The court noted that the UNI-
FORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT was a proposal which "[wihile lacking any legislative sanc-
tion . . . points in the direction of a responsible national trend." Id. at 741-42, 575 P.2d at
1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
79. Two other jurisdictions, hampered somewhat by existing comparative negligence
statutes, have followed the Daly approach for strict liability actions. Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger
& Co., 498 F. Supp. 389 (D. Mont. 1980); Mutherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301
(Utah 1981). Utah and Montana had statutory modified approaches (the "not as great as"
and "not greater than" forms, respectively) applicable to common law tort actions, but
courts in those states deviated from the legislative schemes to effect a "pure" approach for
product litigation.
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will be reduced in accordance with his fault in contributing to the
injury.
VII. THE CONTRIBUTION DILEMMA
When Maryland adopts comparative fault, it should modify its
contribution system. Contribution becomes an issue when multiple de-
fendants are jointly and severally liable. The doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability, which permits a plaintiff to collect his entire judgment
from any one of several joint tortfeasors, is the antithesis of an equita-
ble system of fault-apportioned recovery. Indeed, Maryland's contri-
bution statute attempts to remedy the one-sided harshness of the joint
and several liability doctrine. The remedy is imperfect, however, be-
cause it requires each joint tortfeasor to pay an equal share of the judg-
ment. For example, assume that a jury is instructed to apply
comparative fault principles and returns the following verdict:
Plaintiff D- 1 D-2 D-3
Fault % 20% 60% 10% 10%
Damages $10,000 -0- -0- -0-
Recovery $ 8,000 -0- -0- -0-
Assessment - $6,000 $1,000 $1,000
Under Maryland's present contribution system, the plaintiff could col-
lect all of his damages ($8,000) from D-3, who in turn could recover
contribution only for one-third (1/3) of that amount ($2,666) from D- 1,
and the same from D-2 ($2,666), even though D-3's fault (10%) is much
less than D-l's fault (60%).
To implement the principle that each party should assume liability
only to the extent of his fault in causing an injury-producing event,
Maryland should adopt the Uniform Comparative Fault Act's ap-
proach to contribution. 0 Contribution then would be determined in
accordance with the relative fault percentage of each joint tortfeasor.
Thus D-3 could recover a $6,000 contribution from D-1 and a $1,000
contribution from D-2.
The existing contribution scheme also is unfair in that it places all
risk of a joint tortfeasor's insolvency only on the other tortfeasors. The
Uniform Comparative Fault Act uses a more equitable system, which
reallocates an insolvent's share of a judgment among all parties at
fault, including the plaintiff, in accordance with their respective shares
of fault.8
80. See AcT, supra note 54, § 4.
81. Id. § 2(d).
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In the preceding example, if D-l were judgment proof, the $6,000
assessed D- 1 would be reapportioned according to the relative fault
percentages of plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 (reallocated percentages
and sums to be recovered and paid are in parentheses):
Plaintiff D- 1 D-2 D-3
Fault % 20% (50%) 60% (0%) 10% (25%) 10% (25%)
Damages $10,000 -0- -0- -0-
Recovery $ 8,000($5,000) -0- -0- -0-
Assessment - $6,000 $1,000 $1,000
(insolvent) ($2,500) ($2,500)
Thus, the ratio of the plaintiffs fault to that of each of defendants 2 and
3 would be equitably maintained and the insolvency of D-1 would be
absorbed by all other parties in the litigation.
VIII. SETTLEMENTS BY JOINT TORTFEASORS
When Maryland adopts comparative fault, it also must consider
how to handle a joint tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff. The set-
tling tortfeasor may or may not be a party to the action. If he is joined
in the litigation, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that the
jury should determine his fault percentage along with that of every
other party.82 Non-settling defendants then would pay in accordance
with their respective fault percentages (assuming solvency). In other
words, the settlement with the plaintiff would act as a complete release
of the portion of the judgment attributable to the fault percentage of
the settling tortfeasor, without taking into consideration the amount
which the settling tortfeasor paid for the release.8 3
Plaintiff, for example, settles for $2,500 with D-3. The jury finds
as follows:
Settling
Plaintiff D- 1 D-2 D-3
Fault % 20% 60% 10% 10%
Damages $10,000 - - -
Recovery $9,500 - - -
Assessment - $6,000 $1,000 $2,500
(settlement)
The amounts defendants 1 and 2 would pay to the plaintiff would be
82. See id. § 2.
83. See id. § 6.
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unaffected by the amount D-3 paid for a release, but would instead be
dictated by the percentages found by the jury. Thus the plaintiff gets
the benefit of his advantageous settlement. If, however, the plaintiff
has settled for less than the defendant's proportionate share, the plain-
tiff would bear the loss.
The Uniform Comparative Fault Act does not address the situa-
tion in which the settling defendant has not been made a party. The
determinative factor in this situation should be the amount paid for the
release. The amount of the settlement should be subtracted from the
judgment in proportion to the fault percentages attributed to the joined
defendants. In other words, each joined tortfeasor would deduct from
the amount owed the plaintiff a percentage of the amount paid for a
release by the tortfeasor not joined.
Tortfeasor
Plaintiff D- 1 D-2 Not Joined
Fault % 20% 60% 20% undetermined
Damages $10,000 - - -
Recovery $8,000 - - -
Assessment - $4,125 $1,375 $2,500
(settlement)
The combined fault percentages of defendants 1 and 2 total 80%, of
which the fault percentage of D-1 represents three-fourths. Thus, D-1
should be able to subtract three-fourths of the amount paid for the re-
lease by the tortfeasor not joined ($1,875) from his liability of $6,000
and should be liable to the plaintiff only to the extent of $4,125. A
similar analysis for D-2 would reduce his liability to the plaintiff to
$1,375.
IX. SETOFFS
When Maryland adopts comparative fault, setoffs will play an im-
portant role in the ultimate division of damages. In all cases in which
more than one party is at fault and sustains damages, there can be
setoff between a claim and counterclaim; thus only the difference be-
tween them is recoverable. The following example84 involves three
parties with claims against each other and demonstrates the effect of
setoffs:
84. See H. WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT § 17.4, at 360-61 (1978).
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A B C
Fault % 30% 40% 30%
Damages $8,000 $10,000 $6,000
Entitlement $5,600 $6,000 $4,200
before setoff ($3,200 ($3,000 ($1,900
from B from A from A
& & &
$2,400 $3,000 $2,400
from from from
C) C) B)
Recovery $800 $600 0
after setoff ($200 ($600
from B from
& $600 C)
from
C)
This system appears fair - it simply nets the amounts owed by the
parties.
Inequities may arise, however, if the parties are insured.
Insurance companies will argue that the amount owed by each party to
the other is the net amount receivable after setoff has been applied,
rather than the total amount awarded to each by a jury after comparing
relative fault. Insurance then would pay only the net amount, resulting
in a windfall to liability insurers. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
addresses this problem:
[I]f either or both of the claims are covered by liability insurance
and an insurance carrier's liability under its policy is reduced by
reason of the set-off, the insured is entitled to recover from the
carrier the amount of the reduction. Amounts so recovered shall
be credited against pertinent liability policy limits. For purposes
of uninsured-motorists and similar coverages, the amounts so re-
covered shall be treated as payment of those amounts to the in-
sured by the party liable.
When Maryland adopts comparative fault, it should handle setoffs
in a similar fashion. 5
X. WHO SHALL CHOOSE?
The Maryland General Assembly has considered some form of
comparative fault nearly every year since at least 1966. Having ex-
85. AcT, supra note 54, § 3.
19821
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
amined nineteen bills during that time, committees of the General As-
sembly have reviewed comparative fault in all of its pure and modified
forms.86 Most of the bills were limited to negligence actions only. All
died in committee, although two were passed by the House of Dele-
gates before meeting their ends in the Senate.87
The comparative fault experience demonstrates that the decision
to adopt the doctrine is not necessarily a legislative prerogative. Seven
jurisdictions have judicially adopted comparative fault.88 Further-
more, we should remember that the contributory negligence doctrine it
is designed to replace is one of judicial creation. Although courts typi-
cally defer to legislative policy-making, legislative inaction warrants no
deference.
CONCLUSION
Pure comparative fault is the only form of comparative fault that
truly apportions liability for damages in accordance with a party's fault
in causing those damages. Unlike the modified comparative fault sys-
86. The following bills placed the comparative fault concept in its various forms before
the Maryland General Assembly in the indicated years:
"PURE" "NOT AS GREAT "NOT GREATER
YEAR FORM AS" FORM THAN" FORM
1966 S.B. 111
1967 H.B. 277
1968 H.B. 158
1969 H.B. 63
1970 H.B. 452 H.B. 453
S.B. 116
1971 H.B. 546
1972 H.B. 156
1973 H.B. 785
1974 X X X
1975 H.B. 405
1976 H.B. 377 S.B. 106
1977 H.B. 2004
1978 X X X
1979 H.B. 1381* H.B. 1386
1980 H.B. 1484* H.B. 98
1981 H.B. 633
1982 S.B. 1007
* Uniform Comparative Fault Act
87. In 1968, House Bill 158, which applied a "pure" form of comparative fault to negli-
gence actions involving personal injury, death, or property damage, passed the House of
Delegates with a 114 to 8 vote. It then was assigned to the Senate Judicial Proceedings
Committee from which it never resurfaced. In 1970, a similar fate befell House Bill 453
which applied the "not as great as" formula to such negligence actions. The vote in the
House was 105 to 12.
88. See supra note 28.
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tems and the contributory negligence doctrine, pure comparative fault
generates neither windfall nor unfair burden. Only this form ensures
the fundamental fairness appropriate and necessary to the adjudication
of tort claims in an enlightened society.
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Appendix
Uniform Comparative Fault Act*
SEC.
1. Effect of Contributory Fault
2. Apportionment of Damages
3. Set-off
4. Right of Contribution
5. Enforcement of Contribution
6. Effect of Release
7. Uniformity of Application and Construction
8. Short Title
9. Severability
10. Prospective Effect of Act
11. Repeal
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for in-
jury or death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault
chargeable to the claimant diminishes proportionately the amount
awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the
claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery. This rule ap-
plies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault
constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doc-
trines, such as last clear chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure
negligent or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or
others, or that subject a person to strict tort liability. The term also
includes breach of warranty, unreasonable assumption of risk not con-
stituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which
the defendant otherwise would be liable, and unreasonable failure to
avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal requirements of causal
relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability and to contributory
fault.
Section 2. fApportionment of Damages]
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the
action, including third-party defendants and persons who have been
released under Section 6, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all par-
* Drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1977).
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ties, shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there
is no jury, shall make findings, indicating:
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to re-
cover if contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each
claim that is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defend-
ant, and person who has been released from liability under Section 6.
For this purpose the court may determine that two or more persons are
to be treated as a single party.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the
extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages
claimed.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claim-
ant in accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under Sec-
tion 6, and enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of
rules of joint-and-several liability. For purposes of contribution under
Sections 4 and 5, the court also shall determine and state in the judg-
ment each party's equitable share of the obligation to each claimant in
accordance with the respective percentages of fault.
(d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is
entered, the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equi-
table share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall
reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including
a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault.
The party whose liaiblity is reallocated is nonetheless subject to contri-
bution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
Section 3. [Set-oft]
A claim and counterclaim shall be set off, and only the difference
between them is recoverable in the judgment. However, if either or
both of the claims are covered by liability insurance and an insurance
carrier's liability under its policy is reduced by reason of the set-off, the
insured is entitled to recover from the carrier the amount of the reduc-
tion. Amounts so recovered shall be credited against pertinent liability
policy limits. For purposes of uninsured-motorist and similar cover-
ages, the amounts so recovered shall be treated as payment of those
amounts to the insured by the party liable.
Section 4. [Right of Contribution]
(a) A right of contribution exists between or among two or more
persons who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible
1982]
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claim for the same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has
been recovered against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in
the original action or by a separate action brought for that purpose.
The basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obli-
gation, including the equitable share of a claimant at fault, as deter-
mined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.
(b) Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settle-
ment with a claimant only (1) if the liability of the person against
whom contribution is sought has been extinguished and (2) to the ex-
tent that the amount paid in settlement was reasonable.
Section 5. [Enforcement of Contribution/
(a) If the proportionate fault of the parties to a claim for contribu-
tion has been established previously by the court, as provided by Sec-
tion 2, a party paying more than his equitable share of the obligation,
upon motion, may recover judgment for contribution.
(b) If the proportionate fault of the parties to the claim for contri-
bution has not been established by the court, contribution may be en-
forced in a separate action, whether or not a judgment has been
rendered against either the person seeking contribution or the person
from whom contribution is being sought.
(c) If a judgment has been rendered, the action for contribution
must be commenced within [one year] after the judgment becomes
final. If no judgment has been rendered, the person bringing the action
for contribution either must have (1) discharged by payment the com-
mon liability within the period of the statute of limitations applicable
to the claimant's right of action against him and commenced the action
for contribution within [one year] after payment, or (2) agreed while
action was pending to discharge the common liability and, within [one
year] after the agreement, have paid the liability and commenced an
action for contribution.
Section 6. [Effect ofRelease]
A release, covenant not to sue, or similar agreement entered into
by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liabil-
ity for contribution, but it does not discharge any other persons liable
upon the same claim unless it so provides. However, the claim of the
releasing person against other persons is reduced by the amount of the
released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Section 2.
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Section 7 [Uniformity of Application and Construction]
This Act shall be applied and construed so as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this
Act among states enacting it.
Section 8. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
Section 9. [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or application of it to any person or
circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provi-
sions or applications of the Act that can be given effect without the
invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this
Act are severable.
Section 10. [Prospective Effect ofAct]
This Act applies to all [claims for relief] [causes of action] accruing
after its effective date.
Section 1L [Repeal]
The following acts and parts of acts are repealed:*
This section provides a place for states adopting the UNIFORM ACT to repeal con-
flicting acts or statutes.
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